Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

1997

What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation, Inequality,
Teaching and Life
Carrie Menkel-Meadow
Georgetown University Law Center, meadow@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1763

81 Minn. L. Rev. 1413
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on
Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*
Trina Grillo and I trained together as mediators, met together as law teachers, commiserated together as women and
civil rights activists, and laughed and cried together as friends.
I shall miss her wise counsel, her sensible judgment, her
measured indignation, her gentleness and her razor sharp perceptions about the world, across, through and with her gender,
race, class, and human identities. I shall miss her words, her
presence, her body, her corporeal essence, but she will always
be with me and my students in her spirit and through her contributions to our work. In this Essay I want to reflect on some
of what Trina gave me over the years in the hope that her contributions will continue to be heard, considered and listened to.
Trina and I first met as progressive law teachers-was it
at a Society of American Law Teachers meeting? Or at a Critical Legal Studies meeting? Or at a gathering of feminist law
professors? Or at a Law and Society meeting? It was so long
ago, I forget, because we gathered in all of these places in the
1970s and 1980s, in the shared hopes that law teachers with a
critical edge and an "outsider's" perspective could affect social
change, through teaching and practice that was committed to
progressive ends. We had the sort of easy friendship that
catches up in the interstices of meetings: at coffee, at lunch,
sitting on the floor in living rooms or classrooms, talking,
talking and talking-trying to figure it all out. How to stay
committed to "good works" and also stay in legal education.
How to name what we see and be honest; "Speaking truth to
power" was a favorite expression then. Like many politically
committed people, Trina left legal education for a while for legal practice, for mediation, for mothering, and for being true to
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her principles.' When she returned, she returned committed to
academic support teaching, and, as always, to social justice and
to a new more complicated version of how to use dispute resolution in the world of racial, gender, social, class and sexual
inequalities. It is that particular issue, among others, that I
want to address here.
I am a white woman,2 daughter of Holocaust survivors,
who, growing up with this family history in the 1950s, became
a "race" conscious activist who heard and saw the damage that
racial categories and exclusions could do to staggering numbers of people 3 as well as to the spirit and material well-being
of individuals and families. So as a young girl of a religiously
mixed marriage,5 I was determined to spend my life working
against racial discrimination and other forms of cruelty, intolerance, incivility, and injustice. Like many of my generation
with these values, I went to law school and became a legal
services 6 and civil rights lawyer. When I moved into teaching I
went into clinical education, the branch that promised to stay
connected to real world injustice. Even there, however, I soon
felt the ennui or skepticism that I had felt in practice. I knew
1. Later, in her own work, Trina formed a practice firm, comprised
principally of people of color who were to specialize in mediating disputes in
which race, gender, sexual orientation and other issues of our postmodern,
multicultural conditions were at issue. She wanted to see if sensitive, caring
and politically informed dialogue could work and could be used in service of
justice.
2. I am a "European-American," one generation away from a position of
complete "otherness" from the American laws I now teach and practice. But
cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Power of Narrative in Empathetic Learning:
Post-Modernism and the Stories of Law, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 293-94
(1992) (reviewing PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS:
DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) and describing the difficulties of constructing
identity solely through racial categories, especially when they are "hyphenated"
ones).
3. I have been both repulsed by and obsessed with the efforts to accurately
assess the numbers of deaths in World War II and in the African Diaspora. See,
e.g., JUDITH MILLER, ONE BY ONE (1988) (reporting the different ways that
people and nations remember the Holocaust).
4. Lorraine Hansberry's Raisin in the Sun was one of the first plays and
movies I saw as a young girl.
5. I was raised in Ethical Culture in the middle of the religious revival of
the 1950s.
6. After the publication in 1962 of Michael Harrington's The Other
America, many who were intent on legal reform were reminded to factor poverty, as well as race, into their analyses. Of course, for children of the Depression, children of Marxists, or poor children, class was always part of the
struggle.
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that lawsuits were only one way, and seldom the best way, to
7
solve problems or to "reorient people to each other." For many
of us in the New Left, the interpersonal and the psychological
were also the political.8 As many in the women's movement
were, I was interested in how oppressive social forces and institutions of exclusionary privilege constructed both the public
spaces and private places that controlled, enforced and limited
our lives. 9 Lawsuits and courts were "public spaces," the everyday negotiations, interactions and "mediations" of social life
were the more private places where people really did their
work and lived their lives.
As I turned to other forms of dispute resolution, forms with
more healing potential, few others seemed to be similarly engaged in searching for ways to use healing arts and interpersonal techniques to effect social justice on both individual and
group levels.10 Unlike me, some of those people have put themselves at greater personal and political risk by talking about
conciliation and mediation, and seeming to tolerate "compromise"" in a world of struggle for equity, justice, and equality, a
struggle that demands little or no "concession" to the "oppres-

7. See Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-ItsForms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305, 325 (1971) (describing mediation's capacity to reorient parties by
changing the shared perceptions of their relationship).
8. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (presenting a dialogue between the authors on the role
of unalienated consciousness in political transformation); Peter Gabel, The
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV.1563, 1563-64 (1984) (arguing that a new appreciation
for the details of everyday life is central to understanding how the law constitutes our social existence).
9. See, e.g., GLORIA STEINAM, OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS (1988) (collecting the author's feminist cultural observations and social critiques).
10. Sometimes in the shadowy evenings of "afterthoughts" or late-night
gabfests at ADR conferences you can hear the whisper of people talking about
how racial injustice, child or domestic abuse, divorce, alcoholism, the Holocaust, or religious intolerance in their past or families has motivated them to
seek more productive ways to heal the flesh and hearts and minds torn by
human cruelty. There is a story dwelling in the social and personal origins of
those who labor in the dispute resolution field. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
The Causes of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin Sarat & Stuart
Sheingold eds., forthcoming 1997).
11. For me, mediation is not about compromise. See Carrie MenkelMeadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2672-78 (1995)
(arguing that settlement does not necessarily mean that each party must sacrifice an important claim in order to secure another one).

1416

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:1413

sors." Mediation, conciliation, and ADR are considered by
many to be the enemies of racial justice and equality and free12
dom for the subordinated.
Trina Grillo was one of those people 3 who believed that
mediative processes might work to educate, transform, heal
and persuade, as well as change behaviors at both individual
and group levels, and that they could be used in a wide variety
of contexts. Indeed, she practiced the art of mediation and was
very, very good at it.' 4 Harlon Dalton has written, movingly, of
the special openness and multi-racial consciousness Trina
brought to identity politics-a "spiritual openness" 5 that no
doubt facilitated her work as a mediator. Mediators need to
empathize with multiple parties. As a person of multiracial
and mixed heritage, Trina knew how to see the 'both/and"
rather than the "either/or" 6 nature of racial identity as well as
legal problem-solving.
Therefore, I remember the sinking, chilling feeling I had
when Trina sent me a draft of her now famous article, Mediation-ProcessDangersfor Women, I7 in which, despite an agreeable first footnote citation to some of my work, she criticized,
indeed condemned, the use of some forms of mediation in di12. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing
the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1359, 1387-91 (arguing that alternative dispute resolution may disadvantage
minority disputants). Like many professional organizations, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, an association of mediators and other
neutral third parties, worries about the diversity of its membership and the
profession. It also worries about the uses to which dispute resolution processes are sometimes put.
13. Among those who, like Trina, have been willing to use mediative or
"healing" processes in their words and work in pursuit of racial justice, I count
Chuck Lawrence, Hayward Burns (whom we have also lost this year), Mari
Matsuda, Harlon Dalton, john powell, Howard Gadlin, Wallace Warfield, Isabelle Gunning, Cornel West, Carol Izumi, Peter Gabel, Michael Lewis, and
Linda Singer, to name a few. Although forceful "freedom fighters" in the
struggle for racial equality, these people see the value of the "healing arts."
14. As a long time teacher of mediation, it is in my interest to believe that
one can learn how to mediate, but it is also true that some mediators have a
natural talent-a calmness, a groundedness-that allows parties to feel they
are in safe hands, that someone with judgment and clear thinking and kindness will help them see their way to possible, if tentative and contingent, solutions. Trina was one of those people.
15. See HARLON DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR
BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES 81-83 (1995) (describing his relationship with
Trina).
16. Id. at 82.
17. 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
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vorce and child custody cases. She carefully and gracefully acknowledged the work of those of us who criticized the adversary system as patriarchal, polarizing, objectivist and unfeeling, as juxtaposed with a more relational, party-controlled and
responsive process of choice. 18 Trina then concluded that mediation, at least in its court-ordered mandatory forms, not only
did not fulfill its promises, but was likely to be more dangerous
for women, some men, and generally those who, in our society,
are disadvantaged in one way or another.
Reading the article was like a splash of bone-chilling cold
water. My friend, co-mediator, and co-teacher had joined the
ranks of those who rejected alternative dispute resolution as
an important tool in the project of achieving social justice,
peace, and just results. Her work carefully explored empirical
studies and more importantly, in the new vein of "narrative
scholarship" among critical race scholars, Trina told "stories"
pieced together from mediations she had done, observed, or
heard about. Later, I learned that her own experience in divorce and family change informed parts of the piece. At the
same time, in the felicitous and truly honest and forthright
style that was hers, she disclosed, early in the article:
Although this Article cautions against mediation's dangers, I should
emphasize at this juncture that mediation is the work I most like to
do. Few professional experiences can compare to the moment when
the world of possibilities seems to expand for a couple, and hope and
optimism coexist, at least temporarily, with pain and anger. It is
from my experiences mediating and listening to the stories of those
who have been participants in the mediation process, and out of concern for the integrity of that process, that this Article has been written. 9

I called Trina to talk about her article and learned that on
the same day her article had been accepted for publication in
the Yale Law Journal anniversary issue, she had been diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. I was angry with the injustice of
a world that would not allow her to savor an important moment in an academic's life but cruelly interrupted her hope and
optimism and replaced it with pain, anger and, no doubt, fear.
This moment was transforming for Trina, in ways I will return
to below, because in a subsequent article20 we all learned from
18. See id. at 1548 n.6.
19. Id. at 1150-51.
20. Trina Grllo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race:
The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (and
Other Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 397-98, reprinted in STEPHANIE M.
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Trina how being a cancer patient had, at least for awhile,
trumped all her other identities, and reminded the rest of us of
our most important commonality-our temporality. So instead
of inflicting more pain by arguing with her, I put her in touch
with a colleague of mine who had seemingly and optimistically
recovered from Hodgkin's disease.21
Despite my concerns that Trina's important article and
eloquent voice would stifle support of mediation, I, like so
many in the field, began to teach the article. In a very short
time it became the canonical text of a feminist critique of ADR
that focused primarily on what happens in situations where
people of unequal bargaining power directly confront
each
22
other, with either no or little formal legal protection.
First, the "informal law" of social relations in mediation
constructs the "good" or "bad" woman, contrasting the compliant, child-caring, self-denying and self-denigrating wife with
the demanding, angry, justice-seeking, assertive woman who
could be controlled by the micro-sanctions of mediator interventions. The social control of mediation practice, in Trina's
analysis, created a world which is not "neutral," as promised in
WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996). As Trina said, "[Cjancer has become the first fil-

ter through which I see the world. It used to be race, but now it is cancer."
Id. at 397. Trina and her coauthor, Stephanie Wildman, observed, "Someone
with cancer can think of nothing else.... The cancer patient does not have
the privilege of forgetting about her cancer; even when it is not in the forefront of her thoughts, it remains in the background, coloring her world." Id.
at 397-98.
21. That colleague was Julian Eule, a constitutional law scholar and
teacher who worked tirelessly with cancer patients for many years after his
own "cure." Even though he had been thought to be cancer-free for over 15
years, Julian died some months after Trina. This Essay is dedicated to his
memory as well. To lose two good friends and colleagues in one year is almost
too much to bear. To lose two people of the same age, in the same profession,
and with many of the same goals, people who have contributed so much to the
world and tried so hard to help others, seems too, too cruel. In his own efforts
to consider the use of nonconfrontational methods of dealing with racial inequality, Julian recently served as a participant in a dialogue workshop on affirmative action at UCLA. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 5, 34-35 (1996).
22. See also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and
the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (arguing that divorce mediation denigrates the legal rights of wives, thereby perpetuating male dominance in divorce proceedings); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984) (studying the harmful impact mediation tends to have
in cases of domestic abuse).
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mediation ideology, but replete with normative constructions
in which mediators subtly manipulate the process to produce
the substantive results they prefer (such as joint custody).
Second, while eschewing the abstract and formalist legal
rights of bright line rules, mediation is intended to focus on
context and particularity. This, in Trina's view, disempowers
the claims and appeals to externally created normative standards that have offered hope to some subordinated people.2 3 In
the divorce context in particular, no-fault and more fluid rules
have arguably redounded to the detriment, not benefit, of
women and mothers.24 Unpredictability of rules, Trina argued,
made power, not rights, the currency of mediative discourse.2 5
Third, where law is supplanted by the psychological language of relationship and family systems theory, compromise
and sharing, rather than moral accountability and responsibility, govern.
Fourth, the ideology of mediation, focusing on the "future"
and drafting constitutional agreements for family governance,
displaces discussions of past history, including hurts, anger,
transgressions and sadness. In family mediation, one is just
supposed to "move on" and think of the children. In one of her
most trenchant criticisms of the divorce mediation process,
Trina suggests that "by eliminating discussion of the past, context-in the sense of the relationship's history-is removed.
The result is that we are left with26neither principles nor context as a basis for decisionmaking."

23. Trina had joined the Critical Race Theory critique of Critical Legal
Studies. See generally Symposium, Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987) (presenting several
perspectives on whether the conceptual deconstruction of legal rights undermines the position of minorities in society). She had also joined the feminist
analysis of how legal rights were essential for women's claims to equality. See
generally Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,ProfessionalLanguage, and
Legal Changein Child Custody Decisionmaking,101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988)
(proposing a transition from mediation to a more formalized legal mode in
child custody cases); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589
(1986) (arguing that legal rights play a crucial role in advancing the feminist
agenda).
24. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION at xi-xiv (1985)
(arguing that gender-neutral rules deprive women of the legal and financial
protections that old laws provided).
25. See Grillo, supra note 17, at 1559 (arguing that unpredictability of divorce rules hurts those with the least power).
26. Id. at 1564.
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Similarly, to the extent that mediation ideology and practice treat parties as "equals" in the mediation, "equal" outcomes are molded to a falsely produced equality of discourse or
air-time. If parties are equal, they can share, whether it be
custody or property, regardless of need, performance, fault, and
desert.
While mediation promises the "venting" of feelings and the
allowance of emotions that would be inadmissible in a formal
court proceeding, the reality, as described by Trina, is a tightly
controlled "permitted" discourse which constantly polices by
reminding that "anger is counterproductive" to good solutions
and long-term healthy relationships." The mediation ideology
of neutrality may also be problematic when the parties are not
equal and need some "power balancing."2 8 Finally, mediation
which is ordered by the court can hardly be credited for encouraging "self-determination" if the time, place, manner, and
mediator are chosen by someone other than the parties.
In short, Trina demonstrated, through argument, citation
of empirical studies, and deconstruction and elucidation of the
process, that the promise of mediation was not being met in the
reality of a process turned coercive and manipulative by the
constructs of an ideology and practice of what it is "right" to do
within the mediation process. Though she credited the possibility that a woman's "ethic of care" 29 might inform the process,
the reality was that if women were more relational, they were
likely to be more harmed than helped in a process where there
were no legal protections and the expectations would be to
share (perhaps with an overpowering and wealthier spouse).
Dependence, need for relationship, vulnerability, emotion, and
anger could in fact hurt women in a process that promised to
take those things seriously, but often in practice did not.
Trina did not conclude, at the end of the day, that mediation should be abandoned by women or subordinated people.
She recognized that women, the poor, the abused, and racial
minorities often go to court and lose or feel "raped" by the process. What she so powerfully suggested in her work was that if
27. See id. at 1572 (noting that expressions of anger are frequently discouraged in mediation).
28. A term of art and technique now used to convey the need for a mediator to counter power inequalities or correct for other imbalances between the
parties.
29. See Grillo, supra note 17, at 1601-05 (discussing the application of
Carol Gilligan's "ethic of care" in mediation).
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mediation was to be a corrective for the flaws of the formal
justice system,3" it must do better than the justice system, and
certainly no worse. What she offered was a standard by which
to judge mediation and all forms of dispute resolution: that the
disempowered should not be asked to consent to their own oppression.3 If law is violent 2 then "consent" can also be coerced. Her work illuminated the arguments, made clear and
rich the contours of the polemics, and helped inspire some of
the first rigorous empirical tests of fairness in different modes
of dispute resolution with different racial, ethnic and gender
mixes of disputants.33 She acknowledged and read carefully
the claims of those who hoped that mediation could deliver
more responsive and caring justice.34 But when it didn't, she
offered caution and suggested reforms to improve a process she
found useful.
Some time later, after Trina's first and somewhat successful bout with cancer, 36 we finally did get to talk about her article at a meeting of dispute resolution theorists. While the talk
30. Trina relied most generously on my own critiques of the adversarial
process. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portiain a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985)
(discussing how women's increased presence in the legal community may
shape the law and the lawyering process by introducing more mediative,
problem-solving approaches, rather than adversarial means); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794-821 (1984) (discussing the problemsolving model of negotiation).
31. See Grillo, supra note 17, at 1610 (stating that mediation promises to
empower subordinates, but instead forces parties to acquiesce to their own
oppression).
32. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the violent nature of the
law).
33. See, e.g., GARY LAFREE ET AL., METRO COURT STUDY (1995); Gary LaFree and Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 767 (1996) (studying the effects of litigants' gender and ethnicity on
monetary outcomes in mediated and adjudicated cases).
34. Trina was one of the most careful readers of my own work. Rather
than discrediting my reliance on Gilligan's "ethic of care," Trina carefully
noted that I had argued that who the mediators were could have a significant
impact and that some cases required authoritative rulings and precedents.
See Grillo, supra note 17, at 1603 n.271.
35. See Trina Grillo, Respecting the Struggle: Following the Parties'Lead,
13 MED. Q. 279 (1996).
36. I want to acknowledge the incredible care and support that Trina received from a wonderfully devoted group of friends, particularly Stephanie
Wildman, Catherine Wells, and Michele Hermann.
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was of game theory, cognitive barriers to conflict resolution, 37
rationality, and utility maximization in dispute processes,
Trina and I talked of negotiation, mediation, teaching, and our
lives. I learned to see, through our conversations, the pulls on
her of memberships in multiple communities: race, gender,
mother, teacher, lawyer, mediator, and civil rights activist. We
also shared some changes in our personal lives, her illness, my
fertility problems, and how we would or would not use mediation for disputes or issues in our own personal lives, even as we
continued to serve as third-party neutrals in other people's
disputes and continued to teach others to do the same. I
shared with Trina how her critique had at first made me angry-that she was attacking something I had come to see as a
necessary corrective to the pain and draconian results of
courts, with the promise of processes we could see as enriching,
empowering, and dare I say, humanely transformative. Outside of the divorce context, I had used mediation in university
disputes, group claims, race and ethnic conflict situations,
employment disputes, mass torts, simple personal injury and
had even had a major insurance company lawyer say he had.
been "educated and transformed" by mediation. Slowly, and
employing a feminist Socratic method, we discussed and asked
each other questions and realized that our own personal situations might dictate different choices of processes. I saw what
made Trina skeptical of some forms of ADR, and I came to realize that in situations where I felt disempowered, or like a 'bad
and angry" woman, I would not want to mediate either.
The insight is obvious, if still profound: how we feel about
our own disputes, contexts, experiences and situations should
give us knowledge and remind us of the limits of what we
promise, counsel and teach others. 8 We must avoid saying "do
as I suggest, not as I would want." Trina's own life experiences
led to her research and arguments and produced, for her, a
counterintuitive "friendly but critical" critique of a process she
had wanted to trust but, when she saw what it was capable of
37. The wonderfully stimulating papers presented at that meeting are now
collected in KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BARRiERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(1995).
38. In another context, I have suggested that a modified "Golden Rule"
should inform our lawyering practices: do unto others as you would like them
to do unto you. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic
Gain or PaternalisticJudgment: A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 761, 764 (1990) (proposing a moral standard for analyzing the
conduct of lawyers who lie).
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doing, could not. She made me realize that there were situations I wouldn't want to mediate either-some with my husband, many with my superiors and colleagues at the workplace, some with neighbors and certainly none with Hitler or
the Ku Klux Klan. Principle, power, and politics all may matter more than process. Trina taught that context matters. Our
academic efforts to generalize, describe, and predict must be
tested in the real world. This is a lesson that I, as a socio-legal
scholar and teacher, preached every day. Trina made me feel it
again in the reality of my own "Durkheimian epiphany."39 If
mediation had promise, its reality had to be examined and its
use analyzed from the perspective of those inside the process.
In her subsequent work on the false analogies of racism
and sexism,4" Trina continued to unpack the realities of academic generalities, focusing on how claims that racism and
sexism are alike place whites, and white males in particular, in
the center, essentializing both blacks and females and erasing
the identity of women who are not white, as well as equalizing
or leveling pains and hurts that are not equivalent." In that
piece she argued poignantly, I am black, I am a woman and I
have cancer: these are not the same in the pain, oppression,
and lack of control they offer my life. In the words of that article:
When socially subordinated groups are lumped together, oppression
begins to look like a uniform problem and one may neglect the varying and complex contexts of the different groups being addressed. If
oppression is all the same, then we are all equally able to discuss

39. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of Engaged Social Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 91,
93-102 (1990) (discussing the role of social science in legal studies).
40. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 20 (noting how comparison of oppressions perpetuate racism).
41 See id. at 401-10 (discussing how the sex/race analogy perpetuates
white supremacy). In this work, Trina joined a growing group of critical race
feminists who have been illuminating the intersections of race and gender and
particularizing the experiences of the many. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of the Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 139 (discussing the effects of single-axis discrimination
laws on black women's experiences); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1991)
(discussing the use of coalition-building to advance the interests of women of
color); Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities:On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990) (reprinting the
thoughts of a black woman who looks white).
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each oppression, and there is no felt need for us to listen to and learn
from other socially-subordinated groups.42

These words are important for us all to remember-in my
own teaching (and in mediation), I had often called upon empathy as a method of learning-to get those who were different
from each other to understand each other by getting, not only
into each other's shoes, but into each other's feet. Trina reminds us that the human tendency to analogize in the empathy
process may produce only sympathy, both inaccurate and potentially patronizing. "I can share your pain," is not the same
for a white Jewish woman who worries about, but does not
have cancer, as for a black woman who does. 43 Our tendency is
to experience the Other from our own position, from our own
values, from our own experiences. Analogy helps us do that.
How are we alike so I can feel your pain or understand you?
How is your situation like mine? This is the work that mediators do with parties. Trina reminds us that not all oppression
is the same, just as not all mediation fulfills its promise. We
must examine that and question it and try to move on from
there.
So Trina suggests that we need time for recognition of our
differences and dissimilarities, rather than assuming too
quickly our pain is all the same and our experiences have been
identical. Like other friends of Trina's who have labored in
these fields, we are asked to "be" with that difference for some
time. For Harlon Dalton, we must find struggle, return to the
past wounds which we cannot deny, and engage with each
other before we can heal.' This approach takes into account
Trina's critique that the past cannot be erased in mediation's
focus on the future. It is the claim for reparations, for apology,
for acknowledgment, and for affirmative action. 45 In mediation, as in civil rights' struggles, we must look back before we
can move forward. True resolution of conflicts requires us to
deal with, bring forward and not suppress, conflicts and past,
as well as current, pains. Mediation ideology and practice, if it

42. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 20, at 404.
43. See id. at 397-98 (noting the problem with comparing one's situation
to another's dialog).
44. See DALTON, supra note 15, at 97-101 (arguing that the best method
for racial healing is to candidly confront the past).
45. See CHARLEs R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T GO
BACm MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) (arguing for apology, reparation, and redress in race relations).
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is to be of use in racial justice, must adapt and make room for
acknowledgment of the past and of difference.
From those moments of acknowledging difference and inflicted pain, we can then move on to reconciliation and coalition. Individual insight can help us form collective consciousness. Even if oppression is differentially experienced, there are
resonances and correspondences among those who feel the
weight of oppression, subordination, and inequality.4 6 For
Mari Matsuda, we must ask "the other question," by asking
what particular oppression would one group feel from the vantage point of another oppressed group.4 7 Where is the patriarchy in racism? Where is the homophobia in sexism? Recognition of difference, engagement with it and then coalition across
differences is the hope for antiracist, antioppression work. As
a woman, Trina asked where the racism was in women's works;
as a woman lawyer, Trina asked where the justice was in mediation; as a civil rights activist, she asked where the sexism
and homophobia were located in anti-racist work; as a teacher,
she asked what oppressed students in the unequal relationTrina almost always asked Mari's "other
ships of education.
8
questions."
In this work of questioning, elements of the promise of
mediation return. If we can really listen to each other and not
essentialize, equalize, or analogize that which is not essential,
equal, or the same, but instead deal fairly with difference, in
experience, in material and psychological advantage and in
privilege, then parties who choose to listen might learn from
each other just how they experience the world. While some
have labeled this new form of mediation "transformative me-

46. I do not think that oppression, subordination, and inequality are
themselves all the same. I use these different words consciously to remind us
of the different and, more or less, extreme forms of injustice that exist.
47. Matsuda, supra note 41, at 1189.
48. As Trina's friend Stephanie has suggested, one place to start in the
work against oppression is for whites to acknowledge their privilege and to
make a friend with a person of color. Grillo & Wildman, supra note 20, at 404.
This is controversial advice because many people of color are tired of being
"our" private educators. Yet for me, Trina was one of those friends, whose direct, honest, sincere, challenging, and pointed observations in conversations
always made me ask the questions, question my assumptions, and reflect on
how much I was taking for granted. This kind of conversation, loving but real,
confrontational, and direct when necessary, is one of the ways to justice,
equality and caring. See RoBiN WEST, CARING FoR JUsTICE (forthcoming 1997).
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diation,"49 I prefer to keep it more modest, 50 by calling it conversation, dialogue, and "educative" mediation. I am now
mindful of how the promise of mediation can easily be distorted
by being institutionalized, formalized and concretized in ways
that reflect current power and privilege structures. Trina reminds us that we must be ever vigilant.
As Trina was becoming ill again, I met her at one last conference on gender and conflict resolution. I wanted to engage
her in discussions about my latest project-an explicit effort to
understand how conflict resolution processes could be put in
service of antiracist, antidiscrimination values. In a sense following up on Mari Matsuda's practice, we noticed that we were
talking about race and ethnicity in a conference about gender
and noticing that gender had once again been constructed as
white (there were white men present but few women of color).
Trina asked the hard questions and pushed the participants to
see that the "truth" they might be creating about gender and
conflict resolution would be partial and inadequate. From her
work on mediation, Trina reminded us that within conflict
resolution processes, women are different from each other as
well as from men, and have different endowments, capacities
and resources. Their needs, desires, and wants from a conflict
resolution or negotiation process could vary enormously. To
what extent would any theory of gender and conflict resolution
take account of those differences? Trina probed and pushed
with that spirit of open and critical helpfulness, once again
taking up the banner of the women of color in a sea of wellmeaning white faces.5 As one of the few women of color at a
mostly white teachers conference, she was remembering and
seeing who was absent: the students, the users of conflict
resolution processes, the people of color, the women who questioned an essentialized "women's" experience. Yet she was still
a woman conflict resolver at this conference-she wanted to
contribute her "friendly" critique from within, for if there is
anything Trina continued to care about, it was engagement
49. See ROBERT BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT TROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND REC-

OGNITION (1994).
50. For my critique of the sometimes ethnocentric, paternalistic or grandiose claims of "transformative" mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The

Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions,Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices,11 NEGOTIATION J. 217 (1995) (book review).
51. That the setting was the Harvard Negotiation Project may be of some
significance here.
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with these problems through critique, gentle confrontation, and
challenge.
Together, Trina and I explored new ground on the issues
that confront mediation theory and practice. We discussed my
concern that mediation is a potentially ethnocentric construct,
privileging talk, emotions and the ability to articulate needscultural practices that were not necessarily acceptable in some
cultures. We noted the irony when juxtaposing her work on
the potential disempowering of women in mediation with the
recent work of the linguist, Deborah Tannen, who posits that
women, who use emotional language and articulate needs with
ease, might actually be better at "mediation talk" than some
men.12 We acknowledged the challenges of taking a taskoriented process originally intended to be used on the individual,
interpersonal level and using that process in group conflict, with
no necessary task beyond increasing human understanding. Finally, we agreed to reconstruct these conversations and new
forms of problem solving within the groups they are intended
to serve. 3 These challenges remain, and I shall miss Trina's
potential contributions.
For all her insights, critiques, and challenges to the mediation process, Trina continued to teach it and practice it. She
didn't give up on her hopes for a more just and fair world for
herself, her students, her children, her friends. For me, she
was the model of a socially committed mediator-she listened,
she talked, she asserted and did not "consent" to oppression or
injustice. When she found a process with some promise, like
teaching or mediation, she tried to make it better-to better
mold it to the higher aspirations she had for us as human beings. With her, I was always conscious of both our differences
and our similarities-we had a "both/and," not an "either/or"
friendship. In her kindness and generosity, as well as in her
insistence on justice, I always learned and never felt negatively

52. See DEBORAH TANNEN, You JusT DON'T UNDERSTAND: MEN AND
WOMEN IN CONVERSATION (1990) (discussing the differences between men's
and women's conversation styles); see also DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM
9 TO 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSATION STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS
HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT GETS DONE AT WORK 12 (1994) (noting

the differences between private and public communication between the sexes).
53. For a brief time, Trina, Michele Hermann, Marguerite Millhauser and
I worked on a feminist challenge to the "value-based" mediation of our sometimes colleague and fellow mediator-trainer, Gary Friedman, of the Center for
Mediation in Law in Mill Valley, California, exploring the political dimensions
of our interpersonal work.
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judged. She just made me want to do the work we both cared
about.
I continue to work on how to use mediation and conflict
resolution theories, techniques and practices to try to make the
world a fairer, better place. I am less convinced that "equality"
will ever be achieved or that we will ever agree about what it
means. I have other friends and teachers in this struggle, but
we have all lost one of the most important contributors to this
project. One way to keep her contributions alive is to ask the
question, as I often do, 'What would Trina think about this?"
That helps me "recognize the other" in mediation practice, in
teaching, and in life. Thank you, Trina. I miss you, but know
that we continue to struggle, talk, laugh, and cry in your name.

